One of the hottest hot spots to promote the reform

2022-08-15
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One of the hot spots in promoting the reform of the power system: Discussion on the relevant issues of captive power plants

whether the emergence and existence of captive power plants and their continued existence are reasonable, whether they should bear the society, and to what extent they should bear the society of "policy cross subsidies, government funds and surcharges, system reserve costs", has become a hot spot in the process of promoting the reform of the power system

the emergence and development of self owned power plants in China has a special historical and institutional background. It is the direct result of the increasingly prominent disadvantages of the monopoly system of "exclusive power supply" in the 1980s, and the government's encouragement of "multiple power supply", which is related to the specific environment of power shortage and insufficient power supply capacity. We cannot put aside the historical evolution and look at the captive power plant from the perspective of "isolation" or even "Negation" after the power industry "came out of shortage". With the development of reform and opening up for 40 years, self owned power plants are no longer the old calendar of "high energy consumption and heavy pollution", nor is it as simple as "low power cost", nor can it be generalized as "no commitment to society". Even if the society involved in the dispute is included, the power supply cost of advanced captive power plants still has obvious advantages. Up to now, the existence and sustainable development of captive power plants are still driven by the objective reality of unreasonable high electricity prices, low power supply reliability or difficult power consumption to some extent

enterprise is the basic unit of market economy. The market plays a role in optimizing the allocation of resources through price signals. The main purpose of power system reform is also to "make the market play a decisive role in resource allocation". In a sense, captive power plants are also a result of market allocation of resources. Under the premise of meeting the constraints of environmental protection and energy efficiency, choosing to use electricity from public power or self owned power plants is the right and result of enterprises as market players to make independent decisions in the market economy, and its decision-making basis is not just economic cost. Enterprises that choose self owned power plants also promote employment and increase taxes, which also contribute to the development of market economy. It is a concrete embodiment of market diversity. The government should maintain the right of choice of enterprises

cross subsidy refers to that the industrial and commercial electricity price of public electricity actually bears part of the cost of residential and agricultural electricity. Price policy has the function of economic regulation, and cross subsidy is a common means of price policy. The essence of cross subsidy and other societies is the allocation of some costs among users. This adjustment of cost sharing has not reduced the total electricity cost of the whole society. A general view is that captive power plants should not only bear cross subsidies within the scope of public power, but also emphasize absolute fairness. As a result, the electricity price of some public power enterprises has decreased, and the electricity cost of self owned power plants has increased, which is a "zero sum game" of "robbing Peter to pay Paul". In addition, collection and price reduction are two lines of revenue and expenditure, and it is also a problem whether they can be really conducted in place

the so-called self owned power plants bear the social burden equally, and its purpose is to reduce the industrial and commercial electricity price within the scope of public electricity. This kind of policy measures exposed an incorrect understanding of self owned power plants, and even a kind of policy discrimination from a certain point of view, which neither solved the contradictions accumulated by self owned power plants nor reduced the total electricity cost of the whole society. This policy is afraid to press the gourd to float, which is difficult to achieve the purpose of reducing costs and promoting development. We should look at the social allocation problem from the perspective of the overall interests of the whole social economy, rather than just from the perspective of the interests within the scope of public electricity. To what extent and to what extent cross subsidies and other social contributions should be made, provincial and local governments should make overall planning, balance and independent decisions according to their respective economic and social development conditions. Whether it is price policy differentiation or social differentiation, it is a choice for the government to govern the economy

the current power industry policy does not allow the construction of self owned power plants within the scope of public electricity. If self owned power plants spontaneously use electricity and equally assume cross subsidies and other social responsibilities, should enterprises be allowed to independently choose whether to use electricity from public electricity or self owned power plants under the constraints of environmental protection and energy efficiency, otherwise, enterprises in the market economy will be deprived of the right of independent choice, otherwise, In other words, it is the policy discrimination against power consumption enterprises and self owned power plants. At present, according to the supporting document of this round of power reform, "power enterprises declare the amount of cross subsidies between the electricity prices of various existing users", in the face of information asymmetry, the government cannot accurately calculate and supervise. Taking the data declared by power enterprises as the standard for supplementary payment of captive power plants is both unfair and not serious. In a market economy, the economic obligations of enterprises to the state are reflected in paying taxes according to law. Government funds and "non tax income" such as surcharges should have been the object of gradual cleaning up and standardization. The current policies to further strengthen them are not in line with the general direction of reform. For the system reserve fee, only the self owned power plants that operate together should pay the reserve fee to the electricity according to the agreed capacity, while the self owned power plants that operate alone do not have this fee

the contradiction of the current real economy is that the power consumption cost of enterprises within the scope of public power is high, rather than the cost of self owned power plants is low. Even if the society demanding apportionment in the dispute is included, the power supply cost of the advanced captive power plant still has obvious advantages. Rather than tangle with the "zero sum" problem of social allocation of self owned power plants, it is better to benchmark the public electricity with self owned power plants, and work hard and calmly to reduce the power consumption cost of public power enterprises. Naturally, the demand of self owned power plants will be reduced, and social contradictions such as cross subsidies will be weakened accordingly, that is, to act in accordance with the law of market economy

the purpose of the central government's implementation of the power system reform is to promote the transformation of the power industry from a planned mode to a market mode, and reduce the power consumption cost of the whole society, including public electricity. The essence of regulating captive power plants is to clarify the role in the market economy under the new situation. The essence behind this is the transformation of government governance. An important part of the reform is to optimize and adjust some vague policies and concepts in the past or that do not adapt to the new situation in a pragmatic manner. The government departments implement special treatment for self owned power plants, aiming to coordinate the overall economic and social development and standardize the healthy and orderly development of the self owned power plant industry. Policy makers should not only widely listen to the views of all parties, but also maintain independence, calm, objectivity and impartiality, and should not "deviate". We should not take advantage of the low cost of electricity to "cover up all the ugliness", nor should we use the industry of illegal self owned power plants to "see through the leopard", and we should also avoid being influenced by the public opinion driven by local interests in the power industry

first, it is clear that self owned power plants are the independent choice of enterprises in a market economy. As long as environmental protection and energy efficiency constraints are met, enterprises can independently choose public power or self provided power plants

second, cross subsidies and other social factors should be taken as an independent decision-making matter of the provincial government to confirm the applicability of the 2019 paper industry forecast to a certain process and terminal use, and the extent of allocation should be balanced within the provincial level. At present, in the form of streamlining administration and delegating power, provinces and cities issue documents by themselves. In fact, this is an independent decision-making like a "string puppet", which needs to be changed urgently

third, improve the management policy of self owned power plants, correctly define and treat self owned power plants objectively, and strengthen government supervision. In terms of policy, we should distinguish between parallel self owned power plants and isolated self owned power plants. Those that have formed regional power should no longer be managed as captive power plants, and policies should be formulated by classification

fourth, there is no need to pursue a one size fits all approach to whether self owned power plants are converted to public power plants. The absolutely unified public power will only form a new monopoly, which will eventually affect efficiency and push up the cost of electricity

fifth, we should study and introduce policies and measures to reduce the power consumption cost of enterprises within the scope of public power as soon as possible. Scientifically and comprehensively understand that reducing the power cost of enterprises is not just reducing the electricity price. Optimize the time-of-use electricity price policy and the two-part electricity price policy, strengthen the supervision of electricity investment, reduce the cost of electricity investment, improve the efficiency of electricity investment, drive the employment rate of 100000 people, control the electricity transmission and distribution price within a reasonable range. This material does not produce pest phenomenon, and indeed reduce the loss level of public power lines

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